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Saddlepath learning occurs when agents know the form but not the
coefficients of the saddlepath relationship defining rational expectations
equilibrium. Under saddlepath learning, we obtain a completely general
relationship between determinacy and e-stability, and generalise Minimum
State Variable results previously derived only under full information. When
the system is determinate, we show that a learning process based on the
saddlepath is always e-stable. When the system is indeterminate, we find
there is a unique MSV solution that is iteratively e-stable. However, in this
case there is a sunspot solution that is learnable as well. We conclude by
demonstrating that our results hold for any information set.
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The saddlepath stability characterisation of rational expectations developed by Sargent and Wallace
(1973) represented a major breakthrough in economic theory in the way it encapsulated the disci-
pline rational expectations impose on the equilibrium dynamics of an economic model. In short,
the saddle path describes the combinations of predetermined and non-predetermined variables that
imply expectations consistent with the equilibrium dynamics of a model. The famous paper by Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980) then shows how the saddlepath representation can be obtained as a simple
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the state space representation of the linearised model. The
beauty of this is that the saddle path describes the evolution of rational expectations as an outcome
of the model, rather than expectations having their own free parameters.
The logical cohesion of rational expectations represents the gold standard against which re-
searchers interested in learning and bounded rationality should measure their eﬀorts. It is a formi-
dable benchmark as departures from fully rational expectations inevitably lead into the ‘wilderness’
of Sargent (1993) where it is not obvious how discipline should be imposed on the beliefs of agents.
The problem is that agents can depart from rationality in an inﬁnite number of ways. Attempts have
been made to impose discipline by requiring departures from rationality to be small in a loosely-
deﬁned sense. For example, much of the adaptive learning literature follows Marcet and Sargent
(1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2000) by requiring that departures from rationality should be
small enough so that in the long run the economy converges to rational expectations equilibrium.
In this paper we are inspired by the rational expectations literature to use the saddlepath rela-
tionship to impose discipline on boundedly rational learning. Our idea is that agents are rational
in the sense of being able to correctly identify the form of the saddle path, but depart from full
rationality by not knowing the precise coeﬃcients of the saddle path. To give a concrete example,
if agents are saddlepath learning in the Ramsey model then they know they need to learn the coef-
ﬁcients of the saddlepath relationship determining consumption as a function of the capital stock.
In the terminology of Evans and Honkapohja (2000), saddlepath learning equates to assuming that
agents learn adaptively using the saddlepath as their perceived law of motion for the economy.
Saddlepath learning is a reﬁnement of the minimum state variable (MSV) approach developed
in a series of papers by McCallum (1983, 1998, 1999), which disciplines bounded rationality by
requiring agents to use the correct set of variables as the perceived law of motion of the economy.
The additional requirement we impose is that agents are correctly able to decompose endogenous
variables into states that are predetermined and states that are non-predetermined. Our reﬁnement
oﬀers two main advantages over the MSV approach. Firstly, it is closer to rational expectations
because from the outset it correctly imposes zeros on some of the coeﬃcients of the standard learning
regression. In the MSV approach agents must learn those zeros over time. Secondly, it has greater
2mathematical tractability that gives additional insight into existing results and enables us to derive
new theoretical results.
The tractability of saddlepath learning allows us to derive new results on the relationship be-
tween e-stability and determinacy in linear rational expectations models when the current values of
endogenous variables are in the information set of agents. The biggest news is that we are able to
provide suﬃcient conditions for e-stability of saddlepath learning solutions when the rational expec-
tations equilibrium is indeterminate. We establish that indeterminacy implies existence of a unique
iteratively e-stable saddlepath learning solution. This result improves upon McCallum (2007), who
was unable to obtain general results for the relationship between e-stability and indeterminacy with
the MSV solution. For the case when the rational expectations equilibrium is determinate, we ﬁnd it
is much simpler to prove that determinacy implies e-stability under saddlepath than MSV learning.
The tractability of the saddlepath learning framework also means we can extend this result and show
that determinacy implies that the saddlepath learning process is iteratively e-stable and unique.
The second contribution of the paper uses saddlepath learning as a way to frame the recent debate
on whether information delays, or more generally imperfect information, can overturn the result
that determinacy implies e-stability under MSV learning. An important paper in this literature is
Bullard and Eusepi (2009), who ask what economic assumptions drive the diﬀerences in necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy and e-stability. They conclude that informational delays
break equivalency connections. Such a result was anticipated by McCallum (2007):
“It should be stated clearly at the outset that all results presented here are based on the
assumption that current values of endogenous variables are included in individuals’ infor-
mation sets; if instead only lagged endogenous variables can be observed in the learning
process then diﬀerent E-stability and learnability results would be relevant. Analysis of
a few particular problems in monetary economics involving the latter speciﬁcation has
been conducted in a well-known paper by Bullard and Mitra (2002) while recent papers
by Adam (2003) and Adam et al (2006) have emphasized that diﬀering assumptions about
information sets relevant for learning can lead to diﬀerent conclusions.”
We argue that the emphasis of these papers on informational delays and information sets is
not suﬃciently nuanced. What matters most is not the information set per se but the way that
agents use their information set to learn. In McCallum (2007) agents have information on the
current values of endogenous variables and learn using a perceived law of motion that nests the
saddlepath relationship. In Bullard and Eusepi (2009) agents only have information on the lagged
values of endogenous variables, and learn with a law of motion that does not nest the saddlepath. In
addition to the lagging of the information, we therefore see that Bullard and Eusepi (2009) change
from saddlepath to non-saddlepath learning. This is crucial to their ﬁnding that informational delays
3break the equivalency between determinacy and e-stability. We show this by proving that equivalence
returns once we assume that agents learn a saddlepath relationship under lagged information. Our
result is therefore that determinacy implies e-stability for a wider class of models than previously
suggested in the literature. It is only if agents are not learning the saddlepath that determinacy and
e-stability are disconnected.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we deﬁne saddlepath learning in full information
models where agents know the current values of endogenous variables. We derive propositions showing
the equivalence of determinacy and e-stability conditions, and provide suﬃcient conditions for e-
stability under indeterminacy. Section 3 shows how these results can be extended to models with
lagged information under appropriate assumptions. The most general case of saddlepath learning
under imperfect information is presented in Section 4. A ﬁnal Section 5 concludes.
2 Learning with full information
In full information models the current values of endogenous variables are in the information set of




















where Et denotes expectations formed using information available at time t, zt is a vector of predeter-
mined variables, xt is a vector of non-predetermined variables and εt is a vector of i.i.d. disturbances.
The matrices G11,G12,G21,G22 are conformable with the dimensions of zt and xt. McCallum (2007)
uses a slightly diﬀerent formulation, but in Appendix A we show that it has an equivalent Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) form so there is no loss of generality in our results.
2.1 Solution under rational expectations
In rational expectation equilibrium, agents form rational expectations from the current values of
predetermined variables by using the saddlepath relationship:
Etxt+1 = −Nzt. (2)












from the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the G matrix, with Λ containing the unstable eigen-
values if the system is determinate. The matrix G11 − G12N represents the reduced-form dynamics
and contains the stable eigenvalues if the system is determinate.
42.2 Saddlepath learning
In a learning setting, we move away from rational expectations and require agents to form expec-
tations on the basis of past experience. There are many ways to do this, so it is important that
deviations from rational expectations are small in the sense of not leading to large expectations er-
rors. Throughout this paper, we impose the required discipline by assuming that agents know the
form of the saddlepath relationship (2) but not the individual coeﬃcients in the matrix N. The idea
is that agents are rational enough to identify the form of the saddlepath relationship, but still have
to learn its coeﬃcients. All we require is that agents are able to decompose variables into those that
are predetermined and those that are non-predetermined. Saddlepath learning is then equivalent to
adaptive learning using the saddle path as the perceived law of motion of the economy.
The issue of learning under full information has only been pursued by a small number of authors,
e.g. McCallum (2007), Giannitsarou (2006) and Gaspar et al (2006). The key question is how agents
solve their joint estimation and optimisation problem as information is revealed within the current
period. For example, an agent deciding consumption needs to know how to react to newly-released
retail surveys or manufacturing output data. Gaspar et al (2006) suggest a way for agents to solve
the estimation problem. At the beginning of period t, agents estimate the saddlepath relationship:
˜ Etxt+1 = −Nt−1zt, (4)
using information up to and including period t−1. In other words, −Nt−1 is the ordinary least-squares
estimate of the linear regression of {xj} on {zj−1} for j = 2,...,t−1. Then, during period t, agents
use the estimated saddlepath relationship (4) to adjust expectations as information arrives about
the state of the economy. Under this timing protocol, agents update their model at the beginning of
each period and then apply their estimated model within the period. Gaspar et al (2006) motivate
this by arguing that “it takes more time to re-estimate a forecasting model than to apply an existing
model”. We agree and think that restricting learning to the beginning of each period is a natural way
of solving the estimation problem, without imposing the high computational costs that re-estimating
the model at each point during the period would entail.
How agents solve their decision problem is not explicitly addressed by the existing papers on
learning under full information. Rather, they implicitly assume that agents somehow make decisions
so that endogenous variables and expectations are consistent with the structural form (1) by the end of
the period.1 One possibility is that agents adjust their decisions during the period as new information
is revealed. Coupled with the Gaspar et al (2006) assumption that agents form expectations using the
estimated saddlepath (4), this means that expectations ˜ Etxt, ˜ Etzt, ˜ Etxt+1 and endogenous variables
xt,zt all adjust within the period. Crucially, by the end of the period everything has adjusted so
1This is of course equally true in rational expectations models with full information, which typically do not specify
the mechanism by which decisions and rational expectations become consistent with the model at each period.
5that endogenous variables and expectations are consistent with (i) structural form (1), (ii) estimated
saddlepath (4) and (iii) ˜ Etzt being an unbiased predictor of zt. In full information models (iii) holds
trivially because agents directly observe the current values of aggregate variables.
2.3 Determinate models
The law of motion for non-predetermined variables under learning is obtained by using the estimated
saddlepath relationship (4) to substitute out for expectations in the structural form (1) and obtain:
xt = −(G22 + Nt−1G12)−1[(G21 + Nt−1G11)zt−1 + (H2 + Nt−1H1)εt]. (5)
Using techniques from stochastic approximation theory, Evans and Honkapohja (2000) show that the
coeﬃcient estimates Nt converge to their rational expectations values N under least-squares learning
if e-stability holds for the following diﬀerential equation:
dN
dk
= (G22 + NG12)−1(G21 + NG11) − N, (6)
where k is ‘notional’ time. Local e-stability requires the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (6) to have
negative real parts. The Jacobian is deﬁned by examining deviations ∆vec(N) around the steady-
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In rational expectations equilibrium, the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition (3) implies that (G22+









Proposition 1 If the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for determinacy are satisﬁed then the
saddlepath learning process for N is e-stable.
Proof. Determinacy requires that the number of stable eigenvalues of the G matrix in (1)
to be equal to the number of predetermined variables. If this is the case then the eigenvalues of
Λ−1⊗(G11−G12N)T −I⊗I are of the form λi/λj−1, where λi is a stable eigenvalue from G11−G12N
and λj is an unstable eigenvalue from Λ. The real parts of λi/λj then satisfy real(λi/λj) ≤ |λi/λj| < 1
and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian have negative real parts. The process for learning N is e-stable.
Proposition 1 does not claim that the process for learning N is unique. The following Corollary
provides suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness:
6Corollary. If all the eigenvalues of Λ and G11 − G12N are real and positive then the rational
expectations value of N is uniquely e-stable.
Proof: Any other N would be associated with a switch of stable and unstable eigenvalues
between Λ and G11 − G12N, in which case some values of λi/λj would be greater than one and not
all eigenvalues of the Jacobian would have negative real parts.
The uniqueness corollary does not necessarily hold if eigenvalues are complex or if the eigenvalues
have a mixture of positive and negative real parts, although convergence to an N not associated
with the saddlepath would imply system instability and it is not clear that stochastic approximation
theorems would apply in this case. To obtain unambiguous results on uniqueness we therefore turn
to iterative e-stability. We think of iterative e-stability as freezing the estimated coeﬃcients for a
long period of time, and only re-estimating them at the beginning of the next period. If we do this
many times we obtain discrete-time learning equations for Nk and ∆vec(Nk):
Nk+1 = (G22 + NkG12)−1(G21 + NkG11), (8)
∆vec(Nk+1) =
 
Λ−1 ⊗ (G11 − G12N)T 
∆vec(Nk). (9)
This assumes there is convergence to Nk after a certain number of time periods, and when least
squares learning is started afresh there is convergence to Nk+1, and so on. The question is whether
this sequence converges.
Proposition 2 If the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for determinacy are satisﬁed then the
saddlepath learning process for N is iteratively e-stable and unique.
Proof. The ordinary diﬀerence equation (9) converges provided the eigenvalues of Λ−1 ⊗(G11 −
G12N)T each have modulus less than unity. Since the system is determinate, the eigenvalues are of
the form λi/λj, where λi is a stable eigenvalue from G11 − G12N and λj is an unstable eigenvalue
from Λ. The eigenvalues λi/λj then satisfy |λi/λj| < 1 and the process for learning N is iteratively
e-stable. Uniqueness follows because any other N would be associated with a switch of stable and
unstable eigenvalues between Λ and G11 − G12N, in which case some values of |λi/λj| would be
greater than one.
The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are intuitive under saddlepath learning. As agents can correctly
diﬀerentiate between predetermined and non-predetermined variables, there is a natural correspon-
dence between the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition for rational expectations equilibrium (3) and
the Jacobian of the diﬀerential equation for learning (6). This correspondence is less apparent in the
general set-up of McCallum (2007). The advantages of saddlepath learning are then two-fold. Firstly,
saddlepath learning brings agents closer to rational expectations. In McCallum (2007), agents are
7less rational because they have to learn that lagged values of forward-looking variables are not use-
ful for forecasting. Agents therefore face a redundant regressor problem, so expectations errors are
larger and convergence to rational expectations is slower.2 Secondly, saddlepath learning has greater
transparency and is more amenable to mathematical analysis. In contrast, McCallum (2007) needs
singular value decomposition to obtain a counterpart to Proposition 1 in the general set-up .
2.4 Indeterminate models
If the equilibrium of the model is indeterminate then the rational expectations solution has more
stable eigenvalues than predetermined variables. This suggests an inﬁnite number of possible stable
solution paths, each dependent on the initial expectations of non-predetermined variables. Fortu-
nately, in most cases only one of these paths survives the discipline imposed by saddlepath learning.
Proposition 3 If the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for determinacy are not satisﬁed such
that the system is indeterminate, then the saddlepath learning process for N is e-stable and unique
provided that all eigenvalues of the indeterminate system are real and positive. The saddle path is
associated with the largest eigenvalues of the system.
Proof. The indeterminate system still satisﬁes the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition (3),
although failure of the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions means that some of the eigenvalues
{λj} in Λ are stable rather than unstable. The e-stability of saddlepath learning depends as before
on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian (7) having negative real parts, so the condition for e-stability
is real(λi/λj) ≤ |λi/λj| < 1 as in Proposition 1. If all the eigenvalues of the system are real and
positive, then this obtains uniquely when the saddle path is associated with the largest eigenvalues
of the system. Collecting the largest eigenvalues as {λj} into Λ means that λj > λi and |λi/λj| < 1
for all i,j and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian have negative real parts as required. Associating the
saddle path with any other eigenvalues would mean |λi/λj| > 1 for some i,j and the learning process
for N would not be e-stable.
The e-stability of the saddle path associated with the largest eigenvalues of the system is also a
feature of the minimum state variable (MSV) solution proposed by McCallum (2003) and McCallum
(2007). Indeed, the restriction in Proposition 3 that all eigenvalues are real and positive mirrors
the diﬃculty McCallum had in obtaining general results with the MSV solution. To derive general
results we therefore switch to iterative e-stability.
2In empirical work, Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) avoid the redundant regressor problem by assuming that agents
are saddlepath learning as we suggest, although it is unclear how they arrived at such an interpretation of McCallum
(2007).
8Proposition 4 If the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for determinacy are not satisﬁed such
that the system is indeterminate, then the saddlepath learning process for N is iteratively e-stable
and unique. The saddle path is associated with the eigenvalues of the system that have the largest
modulus.
Proof. Iterative e-stability requires the modulus of the eigenvalues of Λ−1 ⊗ (G11 − G12N)T in
(9) to be less than unity as in the proof of Proposition 2. This is uniquely achieved by associating
the saddle path with the eigenvalues of largest modulus, in which case |λj| > |λi| and |λi/λj| < 1 for
all i,j and the iterative process (9) is stable. Associating the saddle path with any other eigenvalues
would mean |λi/λj| > 1 for some i,j and the learning process for N would not be iteratively e-stable.3
Propositions 3 and 4 abstract from the possibility of sunspots by focusing exclusively on learning
about the saddle path of the indeterminate system. To remedy this, suppose the system is indeter-
minate because one stable eigenvector ´ λ is associated with the saddle path. In this case ´ λ is the only
stable eigenvalue of Λ. If v is the eigenvector corresponding to ´ λ then:
Λv = ´ λv, (10)
to within a multiplicative constant. If we associate a univariate stationary sunspot process:
ηt = ´ ληt−1 + ζt,
to the stable eigenvector, with ζt i.i.d. Gaussian distributed4, then expectations in the indeterminate
rational expectations equilibrium satisfy:
Etxt+1 = −Nzt + v´ ληt. (11)
Combining (10) and (11) with the structural form (1) and the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition
(3) gives:
xt + Nzt−1 + Λ−1(H2 + NH1)εt = vηt. (12)
With saddlepath learning, agents use ordinary least squares to estimate a sunspots-augmented sad-
dlepath relationship between xt and zt−1,ηt. The result is a sequence of estimates {Nk,vk} that
converge in ‘notional’ time k if the sunspot system is e-stable. The characteristic equations for the
convergence of {Nk} are unchanged from (6) and (8) used in the absence of sunspots in Propositions
3 and 4, so the conditions for e-stability and iterative e-stability of the learning process for N are as
before. The characteristic equation for the convergence of {vk} is:
dv
dk
= (G22 + NG12)−1´ λv − v. (13)
3A minor caveat to this proof is that if there are two stable eigenvalues with identical modulus, and only one can be
associated with the saddle path, then there is non-uniqueness and there could be convergence to two diﬀerent saddle
paths.
4Evans and McGough (2005) discuss common factor representations of this type.
9In the limit (G22 + NG12)−1 = Λ−1 and Λv = ´ λv from (10) so dv/dk tends to 0 and v has a
well-deﬁned limit. It follows that the learning process for v converges if the learning process for N
converges. We have:
Proposition 5 If the system described in Proposition 3 has a stationary sunspot process then the
augmented saddlepath learning process for N and v is also e-stable and unique. If the system described
in Propositions 4 has a stationary sunspot process then the augmented saddlepath learning process
for N and v is iteratively e-stable and unique.
2.5 Models with constants
The results in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are derived assuming no constants in the structural form (1)
of the economy. If we allow for constants, and require agents to learn them, then the saddlepath
relationship estimated by agents becomes:
˜ Etxt+1 = −Nt−1zt + at−1,
instead of (4). E-stability and iterative e-stability conditions must then be satisﬁed for the learning
processes of both N and a. Our results replicate ﬁndings that are well-established in the literature
on learning in models with constants, for example see Woodford (1990). Full results appear in
Appendix B. Suﬃce to say here, for determinate models the learning process for a is always e-stable
and iteratively e-stable so Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold. For indeterminate models, the
learning process for a is never e-stable when all the eigenvalues of the system are real and positive,
so Proposition 3 no longer applies. The learning process for a is similarly never iteratively e-stable
in indeterminate models and Proposition 4 fails in models with constants.
3 Learning with lagged information
The usual assumption in learning models is not that agents know the current values of endogenous
variables. Instead, agents are assumed to have lagged information only relating to the previous
period. This is sensible, but raises the question of how and when agents learn on the basis of
that lagged information. Our preferred answer is inspired by the timing protocol we adopted for
learning with full information. There, agents undertook learning at the beginning of period t using
information about period t − 1. By analogy, we suggest a timing protocol for lagged information
models in which agents also learn at the beginning of period t using information about period t −1.
Agents hence continue to estimate a saddlepath relationship at the beginning of period t, which with
lagged information is between expected future values of non-predetermined variables and expected
current values of predetermined variables. Bullard and Eusepi (2009) make a diﬀerent assumption
10by requiring agents to estimate a relationship between expected future values of non-predetermined
variables and the known lagged values of predetermined variables at the beginning of period t. As a
consequence, there is no mechanism to ensure that a saddlepath relationship analogous to equation
(4) holds under learning. Seen this way, it is not surprising that Bullard and Eusepi (2009) have
diﬃculty obtaining general results for the relationship between determinacy and e-stability conditions
in their models. They deviate from the full information benchmark twofold, ﬁrst by restricting the
information available to agents and second by changing from saddlepath to non-saddlepath learning.
In what follows we show that restricting the information set of agents does not in itself overturn
our equivalence results. That Bullard and Eusepi (2009) ﬁnd equivalence breaking down in their
models must then be due to their assumption that agents are not saddlepath learning. Information
delays per se are not enough. In this section we continue to work with models that can be written
in the same Blanchard and Kahn (1990) form as the full information case, but impose restrictions
on the parameters of the state space so our results are directly comparable to Bullard and Eusepi
(2009). Speciﬁcally, they assume that predetermined variables zt follow a purely exogenous process



















with agents knowing G11. The notation Et is retained for expectations formed using the (now lagged)
information available at time t. We return to the more general case where G12 is not necessarily zero
in Section 4.
3.1 Solution under rational expectations
The saddlepath relationship in rational expectations equilibrium with lagged information is a consis-
tency requirement on the expectations of future non-predetermined variables and the expectations
of current predetermined variables:
Etxt+1 = −NEtzt. (15)












Reduced-form equations describing how agents form rational expectations with lagged information
are obtained by substituting the saddlepath relationship (15) into the structure of the economy (14),
11taking expectations, and simplifying using the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition (16):
Etxt = −Nzt−1,
Etzt = G11zt−1,
Etxt+1 = (G21 − NG22)zt−1.
3.2 Saddlepath learning
Agents face a joint estimation and decision problem when learning with lagged information, as they
did when learning with full information. Indeed, the e-stability and determinacy conditions for
learning with lagged information are the same as those with full information if agents are saddlepath
learning. To see why, we proceed analogously to the full information case by assuming agents solve
their estimation problem by estimating a saddlepath relationship:
˜ Etxt+1 = −Nt−1 ˜ Etzt, (17)
at the beginning of period t. −Nt−1 is the ordinary least-squares estimate of the linear regression of
{xj} on {zj−1} for j = 2,...,t−1. It is subscript t−1 to stress that it is estimated using information
up to and including period t − 1 when information is lagged. Agents use the estimated saddlepath
relationship (17) to ensure that expectations remain consistent during period t.
The way agents solve their decision problem can also be taken from the full information case,
in that expectations ˜ Etxt, ˜ Etzt, ˜ Etxt+1 and endogenous variables xt,zt are all assumed to adjust
within the period. As before, by the end of each period endogenous variables and expectations
are consistent with (i) structural form (14), (ii) estimated saddlepath (17) and (iii) ˜ Etzt being an
unbiased predictor of zt. Condition (iii) is no longer trivial when information is lagged, but holds
because of the assumption that zt follows a known exogenous process. This means that agents have
unbiased expectations of the present - but not necessarily the future - when learning.
The structural form (14), saddlepath relationship (17), and the unbiasedness of ˜ Etzt determine
the law of motion for non-predetermined variables with learning and lagged information as:
xt = −G−1
22 [(G21 + Nt−1G11)zt−1 + (H2 + Nt−1H1)εt + Nt−1ηt], (18)
where ηt = ˜ Etzt − zt is an error term with mean zero. It is obvious from a comparison of equation
(18) to equation (5) with G12 = 0 that the least-squares estimates of Nt−1 in the lagged information
case will follow a similar path to the least-squares estimates of Nt−1 in the full information case. The
e-stability and determinacy conditions are the same for both cases. We summarise this as follows:
Proposition 6 If the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for determinacy are satisﬁed then the
saddlepath learning process for N is e-stable and uniquely iteratively e-stable under both full and
lagged information.
12It is straightforward to conﬁrm that Propositions 1 through 5 continue to hold for saddlepath
learning with lagged information. We do not report these calculations, but take the opportunity
to highlight that our earlier results on indeterminate models and sunspots also apply in the lagged
information case. The isomorphism between e-stability and determinacy is not therefore dependent
on whether agents have full or lagged information.
4 Learning with imperfect information
The equivalence of the full and lagged information results above is a portent of our most general
result, namely that the relationship between e-stability and determinacy conditions is independent of
the information set of agents. To prove this, we introduce a general model with imperfect information
where agents observe linear combinations of the endogenous variables xt and zt subject to possible
measurement errors. The model with imperfect information nests that with full information if agents
observe xt and zt without measurement error. It nests the model with lagged information once
lagged variables are included as observables amongst the predetermined variables zt. To analyse the
imperfect information case it is necessary to write the model in state space form. The structural
form (1) is unsuitable as it stands because there are measurements in zt on the left hand side and
xt on the right hand side. Instead, we expand the set of predetermined variables to kt = (εT
t zT
t−1)T



























Equation (19) is the state transition equation of the state space form. Equation (20) is the measure-
ment equation, with vt the measurement errors. Note that zt = G11zt−1 + G12xt + H1εt from the
structural form (1), so zt will be observable to agents for suitable choices of K1 and K2.
4.1 Solution under rational expectations
The saddlepath relationship in rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect information imposes
consistency on expectations of future non-predetermined variables xt+1 and our expanded set of
predetermined variables kt+1:
Etxt+1 = −NEtkt+1, (21)













by an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the A matrix in (19). Λ is a square matrix contain-
ing the unstable eigenvalues if the system is determinate. In rational expectations equilibrium the
saddlepath also imposes the consistency requirement Etxt = −NEtkt on expectations of current
variables. The law of motion for non-predetermined variables is:
xt = −(A22 + NA12)−1[(A21 + NA11)kt + NB1εt+1 + Nζt+1], (23)
where ζt+1 = Etkt+1 − kt+1 is a rational expectations error.5 Agents form rational expectations of
current predetermined variables by applying the Kalman ﬁlter:
Etkt = Et−1kt + J(wt − (K1 − K2N)Et−1kt), (24)
where the Kalman gain matrix J is deﬁned by:
J = P(K1 − K2A−1
22 A21)T((K1 − K2N)P(K1 − K2A−1
22 A21)T + V )−1, (25)
and V is the variance-covariance matrix of the measurement errors vt.6 The matrix P ≡ cov(kt −
Et−1kt) satisﬁes a Riccati equation:
P = (A11 − A12A−1
22 A21)P(A11 − A12A−1
22 A21)T
−(A11 − A12A−1
22 A21)P(K1 − K2A−1
22 A21)T
×((K1 − K2A−1
22 A21)P(K1 − K2A−1
22 A21)T + V )−1
×P(K1 − K2A−1
22 A21)(A11 − A12A−1
22 A21)T + B1cov(εt)BT
1 . (26)
The rational expectation of future predetermined variables is a linear mapping:
Etkt+1 = (A11 − A12N)Etkt,
of the rational expectation of current predetermined variables. Note that the matrix P in the Riccati
equation is independent of the matrix N in the saddlepath relationship.
5ζt+1 is a hybrid term that includes rational expectations errors caused by unpredictable shocks εt+1 and by imperfect
inferences on the current state of the economy. The rational expectations errors caused by shocks are −B1εt+1, which
cancels the NB1εt+1 term in equation (23) and means there is correctly no role for t + 1 shocks in determining xt.
6See Appendix C and Pearlman et al. (1986) for a full derivation the Kalman gain matrix (25).
144.2 Saddlepath learning
Maintaining our analogy with the full information case, saddlepath learning with imperfect informa-
tion requires agents to estimate a relationship:
˜ Etxt+1 = −Nt−1 ˜ Etkt+1, (27)
at the beginning of period t. −Nt−1 is the ordinary least-squares estimate of the linear regression
of {Ejxj} on {Ejkj} for j = 1,...,t − 1. Expectations ˜ Etxt, ˜ Etkt, ˜ Etxt+1, ˜ Etkt+1 and endogenous
variables xt,zt adjust as decisions are made, and by the end of the period expectations and endogenous
variables are consistent with (i) structural form (19), (ii) estimated saddlepath (27) and (iii) ˜ Etkt+1
being an unbiased predictor of kt+1. Once these conditions are satisﬁed, the law of motion for
non-predetermined variables with learning and imperfect information is:
xt = −(A22 + Nt−1A12)−1[(A21 + Nt−1A11)kt + Nt−1B1εt+1 + Nt−1ηt+1], (28)
where ηt+1 = ˜ Etkt+1−kt+1 is an error term with mean zero.7 Equation (28) has the same form as the
law of motion for non-predetermined variables with full information (5), so again the least squares
estimate of Nt−1 in the imperfect information case follows a similar path to the least squares estimate
of Nt−1 in the full information case. The e-stability and determinacy conditions must therefore be
the same in both cases:
Proposition 7 If the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions for determinacy are satisﬁed then the
saddlepath learning process for N is e-stable and uniquely iteratively e-stable under any information
set.
Propositions 1-5 also hold for any information set when agents are saddlepath learning.
Condition (iii) that ˜ Etkt+1 is an unbiased predictor of kt+1 requires further justiﬁcation when
learning with imperfect information. Since kt+1 = (εT
t+1 zT
t )T, it implies that agents recognise εt+1
as a shock with mean zero, and are able to make unbiased inferences about the current state of
predetermined variables zt. Recognising εt+1 as a shock is satisﬁed by assumption, but making
unbiased inferences depends on how agents are assumed to infer the current state of the economy. In
rational expectations equilibrium agents use equation (24) to infer the current state, so one possibility
is to assume that agents have suﬃcient information to construct an unbiased Kalman ﬁlter with
which to make inferences. Whilst the information needed to do so is arguably large, the calculations
7As with rational expectations, ηt+1 is a hybrid term that captures expectations errors caused by shocks εt+1 and
imperfect inferences about the current state of the economy. Agents understand that εt+1 is a shock with impact B1,










T contains an element that cancels the Nt−1B1εt+1 term in equation (28) as before.
Fluctuations in xt are then driven purely by expectations errors ˜ Etzt − zt and there is no dependence on t + 1 dated
shocks.
15required are completely distinct from those needed to solve the rational expectations model and
make decisions consistent with the saddlepath. As an extreme, it is not inconceivable that agents
know the structural form (19) but are unable to solve the model forward to obtain the saddlepath
relationship (21). Such agents can infer the current state of the economy but have to learn how to
form expectations of the future.8 Less extremely, agents could estimate the structure of the economy
whilst learning the saddlepath relationship. The estimates of the parameters in the structural form
converge by the properties of ordinary least squares estimators, and estimates Pt of the precision
matrix converge to the rational expectations value P as the Riccati equation (26) is independent of
N. This leaves the Kalman gain matrix Jt, which converges to the rational expectations value J as
Pt → P and Nt → N. We therefore conclude that ˜ Etkt+1 is an unbiased predictor of kt+1, either
because agents have suﬃcient information to construct an unbiased Kalman ﬁlter or as the outcome
of a well-deﬁned learning process.
5 Conclusions
The initial motivation for this paper was to discipline boundedly rational agents by requiring them
to learn through a saddlepath relationship. Doing so ensures deviations from rational expectations
are ‘small’, with agents able to correctly decompose endogenous variables into states that are prede-
termined and states that are non-predetermined. An unexpected by-product of saddlepath learning
is greater mathematical tractability and transparency. Many of the terms that appear in the eigen-
value condition for determinacy also appear in the eigenvalue condition for e-stability of saddlepath
learning. This is ultimately what gives us traction to clarify and improve upon existing results.
We show that the e-stability results of McCallum (2007) relate to learning about the saddlepath
relationship. Furthermore, his inclusion of all variables in the least-squares regression leads to greater
variability in the estimates and therefore slower convergence to rational expectations. For the inde-
terminacy case we have two new results. Firstly, there is convergence to a unique saddlepath under
iterative e-stability. The saddlepath is associated with the eigenvalues of the system that have the
largest modulus. Secondly, we show that the impact of sunspots on non-predetermined variables is
also learnable. Thus when a model is indeterminate we cannot ignore sunspots under rational expec-
tations or learning. All these results hold for any information set, be it full, lagged or imperfect, as
long as agents are saddlepath learning. This generality suggests a much closer connection between
determinacy and e-stability than found by Bullard and Eusepi (2009) for non-saddlepath learning.
8The Bullard and Eusepi (2009) assumption that predetermined variables follow a known exogenous process meant
that agents were in exactly this position in the lagged information models of Section 3.
16A Conversion of McCallum form to Blanchard and Kahn form
We show that the setup used by McCallum (2007) and others, namely:
A0Etyt+1 + A1yt = A2yt−1 + Bεt, (A.1)
where A0 is not of full rank, can be rewritten in a state-space form suitable for applying the Blanchard-
Kahn conditions. We assume that it is possible to solve the system for Etyt+1 in terms of yt, yt−1
9
and write the conversion to state space form as an algorithm. yt is of dimension n.
1. Obtain the singular value decomposition for matrix A0: A0 = UDV T, where U,V are unitary
matrices. Assuming that only the ﬁrst m values of the diagonal matrix D are non-zero, we can
rewrite this as A0 = U1D1V T
1 , where U1 are the ﬁrst m columns of U, D1 is the ﬁrst m × m
block of D and V T
1 are the ﬁrst m rows of V T.
2. Multiply (A.1) by D−1
1 UT
1 , which yields:
V T
1 Etyt+1 + D−1
1 UT
1 A1yt = D−1
1 UT
1 A2yt−1 + D−1
1 UT
1 Bεt. (A.2)
Now deﬁne xt = V T
1 yt, st = V T
2 yt, and use the fact that I = V V T = V1V T





1 A1(V1xt + V2st) = D−1
1 UT
1 A2(V1xt−1 + V2st−1) + D−1
1 UT
1 Bεt. (A.3)
3. Multiply (A.1) by UT
2 , where U2 are the last n − m columns of U (with UT
2 U1 = 0), which
yields:
UT
2 A1yt = UT
2 A2yt−1 + UT
2 Buεt. (A.4)
This can be rewritten as:
UT
2 A1(V1xt + V2st) = UT
2 A2(V1xt−1 + V2st−1) + UT
2 Bεt. (A.5)
4. UT
2 A1V2 is invertible by Assumption 1, which means that we can rewrite (A.3) as:
st + (UT
2 A1V1)−1UT
2 A1V1xt = (UT
2 A1V1)−1(UT
2 A2(V1xt−1 + V2st−1) + UT
2 Bεt), (A.6)














































9This rules out post-recursive expectations which are generated by systems of the form at = ρat−1+εt, bt = Etat+1.




2 A2V2 G12 = (UT
2 A1V1)−1UT





1 A2V2 G32 = D−1
1 UT





2 B H3 = D−1
1 UT
1 B F = D−1
1 UT
1 A1V2
Multiplying (A.5) by the inverse of the far left matrix in (A.5) yields the required state-space
setup.
For the purist, this is not quite good enough, because the states st, xt are now linear combinations
of the underlying variables y1t, ..., ynt. Consider therefore the ﬁrst terms of equations (A.3) and
(A.6), where the latter are expressed again in terms of yt. If the number of non-zero columns of
V T
1 is equal to m then we can rewrite the forward-looking equation (A.3) purely in terms of those
m elements of yt that are multiplied by those non-zero columns. These elements of yt are then
the forward-looking looking variables. However, suppose the number of non-zero columns of V T
1 is
greater than m e.g. a system like Ety1,t+1 + Ety2,t+1 = y1t, y1t − y2t = y2,t−1 + εt. In principle we
can advance (A.6) by one period, take expectations, and then solve for Etyt+1 in terms of yt,yt−1.
Then substitute some of these expectations into (A.3) so that one is left with only m forward-looking
variables. But which ones to substitute out, and can we be sure that such a representation exists?
The latter question is equivalent to asking whether there exists a set of m columns of V T
1 and a set
of n − m columns of V T
2 that are non-aligned with one another in Ψ = [V1 V2]T, and which are each
of full rank. We prove this by contradiction. Denote the determinants of each such corresponding
set i by d1i and d2i. Suppose that for all such corresponding sets either or both of d1i and d2i is 0,
so that their product is 0. But the (non-zero) determinant of Ψ is the sum of all of these products
d1id2i weighted by either 1 or -1. Hence not all of these can be zero. Thus we deduce that there are
mutually exclusive subsets y1 and y2 of y such that Ety1
t+1 = f1(yt,yt−1,εt), y2
t = f2(y1
t,yt−1,εt).
For the case of partial information the logic is identical, except that when we advance by one
period and take expectations of (A.6), we introduce terms in Etyt, so that the forward-looking
equations take the form Ety1
t+1 = g1(yt,Etyt,yt−1,εt). This extension is covered for the rational
expectations solution in Pearlman et al (1986), and is a trivial extension to our analysis of learning
in the main text.
B Learning about constants
Here we summarize e-stability results on learning about the constants, which are well-known in the
literature e.g. Woodford (1990), but cast them in our general framework. In addition, we extend
the results to iterative e-stability. Suppose (1) has constants (c1 c2)T on the RHS, and assume
that expectations in (4) are augmented by the constants at−1. It then follows that there is an
18additional term (G22 + Nt−1G12)−1(at−1 − Nt−1c1 − c2) on the RHS of (5) Recalling that under
rational expectations we have G22+NG12 = ΛU, it is easy to show that under updated least-squares





This is the case when there is determinacy; if the eigenvalues of ΛU are greater than 1, then their
inverses will have real part less than 1. When there is indeterminacy, some of the eigenvalues of
ΛU may be less than 1; if these are real, then e-stability only holds if they are negative. If they
are complex, then E-stability holds if the real part of their inverses are less than 1. For iterative
E-stability, the requirement is stability of:
ak+1 = Λ−1
U ak.
This can only ever be the case when the system is determinate. For indeterminacy, at least one of
the eigenvalues of ΛU will have an inverse that lies outside the unit circle.
C Kalman gain matrix J with imperfect information
Assume that there is a saddlepath relationship:












and Λ is a square matrix with unstable eigenvalues only. It is clear that this is consistent with
Etxt+j + NEtkt+j = 0 for all j > 0. In addition, by taking expectations of the equations involving
kt+1 and Etxt+1 using information at time t, and applying the saddlepath relationship, this yields:
Etxt + NEtkt = 0. (C.2)
Now focus on the equation involving Etxt+1. Taking expectations of this equation using informa-
tion at time t and subtracting from the original equation yields:
A21(kt − Etkt) + A22(xt − Etxt) = 0. (C.3)
From (C.2) and (C.3) we deduce that:
xt = −A−1
22 A21kt + (A−1
22 A21 − N)Etkt. (C.4)
Now assume that the Kalman ﬁltering update for Etkt is given by:
Etkt = Et−1kt + J(wt − MEt−1kt) where M = K1 − K2N. (C.5)
19It then follows that we can rewrite the measurement equation:
wt = K1kt+K2xt+vt = (K1−K2A−1
22 A21)kt+K2(A−1
22 A21−N)(Et−1kt+J(wt−MEt−1kt))+vt. (C.6)
Deﬁning D = K1 − K2A−1
22 A21 and the innovations process ˜ kt = kt − Et−1kt, (C.6) can be rewritten
as:
(I + (D − M)J)(wt − MEt−1kt) = D˜ kt + vt. (C.7)
Now deﬁne cov(˜ kt) = P. Recalling that kt = ˜ kt + Et−1kt, it follows that we can use (C.7) to obtain
the best estimate of kt using the measurement wt, which implies that J = PDT(DPDT +V )−1(I +
(D − M)J) by comparing with (C.5), where V = cov(vt). Simple algebra then shows that:
J = PDT(MPDT + V )−1. (29)
Then taking expectations of the kt+1 equation gives the updating equation for Etkt+1 in terms of
Etkt, and subtracting this from the kt+1 equation yields an equation for ˜ kt+1 in terms of kt − Etkt
and xt − Etxt. Substituting for the latter from (C.3), for Etkt from (C.5), and for (wt − MEt−1kt)
from (C.7), it follows that the equation for ˜ kt is given by:
˜ kt+1 = A˜ kt − APDT(DPDT + V )−1(D˜ kt + vt) + B1εt+1,
with covariance matrix P therefore given by:
P = APAT − APDT(DPDT + V )−1PDAT + U A = A11 − A12A−1
22 A21 U = B1cov(εt)BT
1 .
This is the Ricatti equation commonly used in Kalman ﬁltering, and we note that it is independent
of the saddlepath matrix N.
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